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The trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Young v. 
Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah 1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
IMAI hereby incorporates the "Statement of the Case" and "Statement of Facts" 
sections from appellee John Lehmer's brief filed in this matter. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly ruled Ockey failed to timely file his conversion claim. Ockey 
alleges IMAI converted his stock on July 1, 1993. Well within three years of this date, in 
early 1994 at the latest, Ockey knew his family had obtained the IMAI stock and knew it was 
being distributed. Ockey claims 13.89 % of the IMAI stock should have been distributed to 
him in accordance with his ownership interest in the Ranch. Yet, Ockey knew the stock was 
not being distributed in this manner - knowing both that he had not received any and that 
other family members, with no ownership interest, were receiving stock. Ockey did not need 
any further information to file his claim. 
It is immaterial Ockey may not have understood the precise details of how the stock 
was being distributed, he only needed to know the basic facts to support a claim for 
conversion. The trial court found Ockey had such knowledge in 1994. The court's findings 
are supported by sufficient evidence so as to rule out clear error. The trial court, therefore, 
must be upheld. 
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The trial court also correctly ruled that even had Ockey filed within the limitation 
period, his claim would still be barred by his subsequent ratification. The IMAI stock 
distribution of which Ockey complains was critical to development of the Ranch. Ockey 
knew, at the time he accepted over Two Million dollars in Ranch profits, such profits were 
in large part made possible by the IMAI stock being sold to those family members willing 
to maintain the State Lease payments and provide ongoing services to IMAI in developing 
the Ranch. Under these circumstances, the trial court properly ruled Ockey could not 
complain of the action while reaping its benefits. 
IMAI asks the trial court be AFFIRMED 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED SCOTT OCKEY'S 
CONVERSION CLAIM WAS BARRED BY THE 3-YEAR STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS 
The trial court correctly ruled Scott Ockey's conversion claim was barred by the 
statute of limitations. Scott Ockey claimed IMAI improperly cancelled stock on July 1,1993 
which should have been distributed to him. In barring this claim, the trial court ruled Ockey 
knew of the cancellation within three years and, accordingly, had to file his claim for 
conversion within the three year statute of limitations. As a corollary to this factual finding, 
because Ockey knew of his claim within the three year period, the discovery rule could not 
toll the statute of limitations. 
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A. The Trial Court's Factual Finding is Reviewed under a Clearly Erroneous 
Standard 
In Sevy v. Security Title Co. of Southern Utah, 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 1995), this 
Court held "the issue of when a claimant discovered or should have discovered the facts 
forming the basis of a cause of action is a question of fact, and the fact finder's conclusion 
cannot be overturned on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous." This means the trial court can 
be overturned "only if the ruling contradicts the great weight of evidence or if the court 
reviewing the evidence is left with 'a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made.'" M a t 635. 
The clearly erroneous standard is highly deferential. All facts must be viewed in a 
light most favorable to the court's ruling. Jouflas v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 927 P.2d 
170, 174 (Utah 1996). Of significance here, great deference is given to the trial court's 
decisions because the witnesses and parties appear before the trial court and the evidence is 
presented there. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,936 (Utah 1994). The trial court is "considered 
to be in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the 
proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court cannot hope to gamer from a cold 
record." Id.\ Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
B. Ockey had Knowledge of His Claim Well Within Three Years, Prohibiting 
Application of the Discovery Rule 
The statute of limitations begins to run on the date the cause of action is complete. 
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"A conversion is an act of willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful 
justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession." 
Allred v. Hinkley, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (Utah 1958). The trial court found, and Ockey does 
not dispute, that the conversion occurred "no later than July 1, 1993." (R. 4603); Ockey 
Brief at 31. The conversion allegedly occurred when Ockey's relatives obtained the IMAI 
stock from Mssrs. Jackson and Rothwell and did not distribute 13.89 % of the stock to Ockey 
in accordance with his ownership interest in the Ranch. 
The trial court determined Ockey knew the family had acquired the IMAI stock well 
within three years and further knew he had not received any despite his Ranch ownership 
interest. Ockey argues he was never told of the precise details of how the stock was 
cancelled and re-issued in accord with payments on the State Lease and other services 
rendered in furtherance of the Ranch's development. But there is no requirement Ockey 
understand every detail of his cause of action. According to this Court, "all that is required 
to trigger the statute of limitations is sufficient information to put plaintiffs on notice to make 
further inquiry if they harbor doubts or questions." Maoris v. Sculptured Software, Inc. ,2001 
UT 43,1}18; 24 P.3d 984, 990. There, the plaintiff knew her husband was negotiating with 
his partner for the buyout of their shares. She subsequently knew such partner and her 
husband had a "falling out" and the partner was not returning phone calls. She further knew 
her stock had been delivered to the partner. The court found that under these circumstances, 
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plaintiff knew the key facts of her claim and "she had a duty to investigate the status of her 
shares." Id. at [^20. 
Here, the trial court found sufficient evidence that Ockey was on notice of his alleged 
conversion claim within the three year limitations period. First, Ockey knew his family had 
obtained the IMAI shares. Ockey admits he knew by 1994 that Jackson and Rothwell had 
defaulted on their obligations to the family and the family would acquire their IMAI stock. 
Ockey Brief at 33. Ockey further admits he testified at trial that "sometime in 1994 he 
learned that Nick Condas and other family members owned IMAI stock." Ockey Brief at 33. 
Thus, by 1994, Ockey knew his family had been issued the IMAI stock Ockey claimed for 
himself. 
Second, Ockey knew the stock had not been distributed in accordance with his Ranch 
ownership theory. Ockey failed to marshal the evidence in support of this point and presents 
no evidence to the contrary. The trial court specifically found that by 1994 Ockey asked his 
uncle, Nick Condas, if he could buy some of his uncle's IMAI shares. (R. 4598) Ockey's 
uncle declined, but suggested some other family members who might sell shares. Id. 
Ockey's mother showed Ockey a ledger reflecting those persons who owned IMAI stock. 
(R. 4599) Ockey knew he did not have shares and knew several persons that did own shares 
had no ownership interest in the Ranch. Id. Ockey knew the IMAI stock was not distributed 
or issued in proportion to Ranch ownership interests. (R. 4602) 
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As in Maoris, Ockey knew of the "key facts" of his conversion claim well within the 
three year limitations period. 2001 UT 43, [^27. He knew the family had obtained the stock 
and he knew that 13.89 % had not been distributed to him in the manner he believed it should 
have been. Ockey argues the facts compiled in his brief show he was not aware of the 
precise mechanism of the alleged conversion, i.e., that Lehmer had voted to cancel the stock 
and redistribute it in exchange for family member's payments of the State Lease and 
subsequent services. Ockey Brief at 37-38. This argument is unavailing. 
First, Ockey knew of the necessary elements of his claim in 1994. In Utah, "the 
discovery rule simply does not apply where the plaintiff, at some point during the limitations 
period, has knowledge of the facts underlying his claim." Burkholz v. Joyce, 972 P.2d 1235, 
1237 (Utah 1998). Ockey did not have to know the precise mechanics of the alleged 
conversion, only that he had been deprived of his possession of the shares. Allred, 328 P.2d 
at 728; In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53, ^ 35; 144 P.3d 1129, 1140 (finding discovery 
rule can only toll limitations period until plaintiff discovered "facts forming the basis for the 
cause of action.") Second, Ockey had a duty to diligently investigate his claim once on notice 
of the basic facts. Maoris, 2001 UT 43, }^27. Ockey presents no evidence to show he 
complied with this duty, but rather presents alternative evidence that Uncle Nick may not 
have spoken with every family member. Ockey's alternative spin of these other facts at most 
shows a competing theory of the evidence, not clear error. 
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This Court reviewed a similar situation in Sevy. The trial court ruled plaintiffs could 
pursue their claim against their title company because they had not discovered their cause of 
action within the limitations period. The Court of Appeals overturned the decision and this 
Court granted cert. This Court found evidence to support either lower court position, but 
held greater deference had to be given to the trial court. The trial court had relied "upon a 
body of facts equal in weight to those relied upon by the court of appeals" which proved the 
trial court's conclusion was not "contrary to the great weight of the evidence." 902 P.2d at 
635. 
Here, the trial court needed to weigh the reasonableness of Ockey's actions in the face 
of facts known to him and defendants' alleged concealment. In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 
UT 53, |^36 (finding statute tolled where heir reasonably inquired of her trusts to attorney 
who drafted documents and was told they did not exist). Ockey claims Lehmer cancelled the 
stock and did not tell him. Ockey Brief at 40. On the other hand, the trial court relied on 
evidence Ockey knew the stock had been turned over to his family, that it had not been 
distributed as he thought it should have been, and that he did not have any stock when he 
believed he was entitled to 13.89 % of the stock. As in Sevy, this Court "cannot find that 
these facts are so insignificant that they give rise to a 'definite and firm conviction' of error." 
Id. at 636. Rather, the trial court had sufficient support to find the discovery rule did not 
apply to justify Ockey's delay in filing his claim. 
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Therefore, Ockey's conversion claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial 
court's ruling should be AFFIRMED. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED OCKEY RATIFIED THE 
ALLEGED CONVERSION OF IMAI STOCK BY HIS RECEIPT OF 
MILLIONS DUE TO HIS OWNERSHIP IN THE RANCH, AND THAT HE 
ACCEPTED THOSE BENEFITS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF IMAI'S 
CONTRIBUTION TO THOSE BENEFITS 
The stock transfer claimed by Ockey to be unlawful was invaluable to the 
development of the Ranch which has paid and will pay Ockey millions of dollars. Ockey's 
knowledge of the alleged conversion accompanied by his acceptance of substantial benefits 
originating from it serves as a ratification of any alleged wrongdoing. 
A. The Trial Court's Factual Findings Must be Accepted as Supported by 
the Record because Ockey Failed to Marshal the Evidence 
Ockey argues "the benefits Ockey received from development of the Ranch - a share 
of the lot sales proceeds - would have been received regardless of whether his stock was 
improperly canceled." Ockey Brief at 26. This is contrary to the trial court's specific 
findings of fact that without the ability to use IMAI stock to fund the State Lease and pursue 
development, there would not have been any lot sale proceeds because the development 
would not have happened. 
Ockey admits the trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Ockey 
Brief at 1-2. To demonstrate clear error, u[a]n appellant must marshal the evidence in 
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support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence." Chen 
v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,Tf 19,100 P.3d 1177. Ockey did not marshal the evidence in support 
of the trial court's findings. Where an appellant fails to marshal the evidence, or does so 
inadequately, "this court assumes that all findings are adequately supported by the evidence." 
Chen, 2004 UT 82 at t 19. 
Accordingly, this Court must accept the fact that at the time the IMAI stock came 
back to the family, "there was an immediate need to make a payment on the State Lease and 
IMAI had no funds with which to make the required payment." (R. 4596). Acting as 
"Lessor's Representative and holder of IMAI stock," John Lehmer canceled the stock at the 
direction of Nick Condas, the family representative. Id. The family then used the IMAI 
stock "to compensate those family members who were willing to fund the development." 
Id. At this time, "development of the Ranch was not assured." (R. 4597). Rather, to have 
any chance at future profit, the family needed to preserve the State Lease. Id. "The 
ownership of the State Lease added value to the development of the Ranch and ultimately 
allowed for the purchase by IMAI of the State Lease land, 505 acres, and an additional 410 
acres that became part of the overall Ranch development." (R. 4601). 
This Court must further accept the fact Ockey "received and retained the benefits of 
the Ranch's development made possible in part by the issuance of the IMAI stock to those 
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who funded the development, contributed services to the development, paid for the State 
Lease, and made possible the acquisition of additional property for the benefit of the entire 
development." (R. 4601-02). Finally, this Court must accept the fact "[Ockey] had 
knowledge of the issuance of IMAI stock to those who funded and contributed services to 
the Ranch development before [he] accepted the benefits made possible by such 
contributions and stock issuances." (R. 4602). 
B. The Trial Court's Factual Findings Support All Elements for Ratification 
or Affirmance under Utah Law 
The trial court made sufficient findings of fact to support each element of ratification 
or affirmance under Utah law. As stated by the Utah Court of Appeals, "It is well-
established under Utah law that' [subsequent affirmance by a principal of a contract made 
on his behalf by one who had at the time neither actual nor apparent authority constitutes a 
ratification, which in general is as effectual as an original authorization.'" Bullock v. State 
Dept. of Transp., 966 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Utah App. 1998); quoting Moses v. Archie 
McFarland & Son, 230 P.2d 571, 573 (1951). The Court of Appeals continued, 
"[ratification is premised upon the knowledge of all material facts and upon an express or 
implied intention on the part of the principal to ratify." Id. (citations omitted). 
Here, the trial court found Ockey ratified or affirmed the issuance of IMAI stock to 
those who could fund the development by accepting and retaining over Two Million dollars 
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in development proceeds just by the time of trial. (R. 4601-02). As stated in Moses, "[a]ny 
conduct which indicates assent by the purported principal to become a party to the 
transaction or which is justifiable only if there is ratification is sufficient." 230 P.2d at 573. 
Such a finding, of course, "requires the principal to have knowledge of all material facts and 
an intent to ratify." Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090,1098 (Utah 
1988) (citations omitted). The trial court satisfied this requirement by finding "[Ockey] had 
knowledge of the issuance of IMAI stock to those who funded and contributed services to 
the Ranch development before [he] accepted the benefits made possible by such 
contributions and stock issuances." (R. 4602). Therefore, the most critical elements of 
ratification, knowledge and intent, were satisfied by Ockey's knowledge the IMAI stock 
distribution benefitted his ownership interest in the Ranch development and his subsequent 
acceptance of such benefits in the form of millions of dollars. 
Ockey argues, however, the initial elements of an agency relationship were never 
established. Ockey Brief at 25. Yet, the trial court found Lehmer canceled the stock as the 
"Lessor's Representative," with Scott Ockey being a "Lessor." (R. 4596). This action was 
taken on Ockey's behalf as a mechanism for compensating those who would fund the 
development of the Ranch. Id. These facts, and the inferences therefrom, are sufficient 
support for the trial court's finding Ockey ratified the allegedly unauthorized acts of IMAI 
in canceling the stock and re-issuing it to family members who paid the State Lease 
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payments and provided services to IMAI. 
The trial court, accordingly, must be AFFIRMED. 
CONCLUSION 
Scott Ockey may not maintain an action for conversion against IMAI. Ockey did not 
file in a timely manner, did not demonstrate any basis for application of the discovery rule, 
and ratified any alleged improprieties by retaining millions of dollars in benefits from the 
Ranch development. IMAI asks the trial court be AFFIRMED. 
DATED this j ^ _ day of February, 2007. 
SILVESTER & CONROY, L.C. 
SPENCER-SIEBERS 
Attorneys for Defendant/Cross-
Appellant/Appellee Iron Mountain 
Alliance, Inc. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT TN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT J. OCKEY and CATHERINE 
CONDAS, et al, : 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN LEHMER and IRON MOUNTAIN 
ALLIANCE, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 970200081 CV 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
This matter was brought before the Court for trial, initially by jury, beginning on January 18, 
2002 and ending on January 24, 2002, the Honorable Robert K. Hilder presiding. Eric P. Lee and 
Craig A. Hoggan appeared for Plaintiffs Scott J. Ockey ("Scott") and Cathy Condas ("Cathy"). 
Matthew L. Lalli appeared for Defendant John Lehmer ('Lehmer"). Dennis J. Conroy and Michael 
S. Johnson appeared for defendant Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc. ("MAT). 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 2 2 2003 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This case was originally filed on June 19, 1997. The Plaintiffs amended their complaint 
several times. As of the date of trial, the controlling pleading was Plaintiffs' Third Amended 
Complaint. The Third Amended Complaint contained nine causes of action asserted against 
numerous defendants, including Lehmer and MAI. There were also various counterclaims and. 
third-party claims. However, because of settlements and dismissals, the only defendants remaining 
at the time of trial were Lehmer and MAI. Furthermore, only two causes of action remained against 
these two defendants: breach of fiduciary duty against Lehmer (third cause of action) and 
conversion against Lehmer and TMAI (sixth cause of action). 
On January 24, 2002, the last day of trial, all parties rested their respective cases, the jury 
was excused and various motions were argued to the court. Based upon those arguments, the law, 
and the evidence presented at trial, the court made certain bench rulings which resulted in the 
dismissal of the jury, the claims against John Lehmer being dismissed, and the Court's express 
indication that it would entering findings and conclusions that MAI has no liability to plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs never consented to a trial by jury. Defendants relied on the jury demand filed by 
Alexandra Ockey for their right to a jury trial. When Plaintiffs moved to dismiss their claims 
against Ms. Ockey very close to trial, defendants opposed the dismissal to the extent it might deprive 
them of their right to jury trial. The Court advised the parties that, if the issues that ultimately would 
be decided by the finder of fact included legal claims, the jury would decide the case because the 
Defendants rightfully relied on Alexandra Ockey's jury demand. However, if the only remaining 
issues after trial were equitable (either the claims or the remedies), then the jury would be advisory 
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only, unless all parties consented to the jury deciding the claims. Absent such consent, the Court 
would decide both the law and the facts. For the reasons stated below, as of January 24, 2002, the 
Court determined that all remaining claims were equitable because the Plaintiffs exclusively sought 
an equitable remedy. Because of the exclusively equitable remedies requested and because Plaintiffs 
never consented to a jury, the Court announced that it was dismissing the advisory jury and would, 
decide all remaining issues of fact and law. None of the parties objected. 
On January 24, 2002, Plaintiffs reiterated their position that they had no adequate remedy 
at law and were seeking only an equitable remedy for return of stock allegedly converted from 
them.1 Given Plaintiffs' admission and the Court's conclusion that Plaintiffs have no adequate 
remedy at law, the Court granted Lehmer's motion for directed verdict on the grounds that Plaintiffs 
had no remedy against Lehmer because their elected equitable remedy — return of the allegedly 
converted stock- was merely damages in the guise of equity. The Court could determine no other 
equitable remedy that could be enforced against Lehmer. 
After dismissing all claims against Lehmer, Plaintiffs then suggested that the parties waive 
closing argument and stipulate to the Court's entry of judgment. All parties agreed to the proposed 
stipulation and the Court then ruled that MAI, the sole remaining defendant, would be dismissed 
as well. 
Having considered all the evidence presented by the parties and the arguments presented by 
counsel, the Court now enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
Because the Plaintiffs did not plead an equitable remedy with respect to their breach of fiduciary duty claim against 
Lehmer, Plaintiffs moved the Court to amend this claim to conform to the evidence. The Court took the motion 
under advisement and, for the reasons stated in these findings of fact and conclusions of law, declines to decide 
Plaintiffs' motion. 
3 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Condas Family Ranch (the "Ranch") historically consisted of approximately 
2,700 acres in Summit County, Utah, located between what is now known as The Canyons and Park 
City ski resorts. 
2. Before his death, John G. Condas owned the Ranch. Upon his death in 1969, John 
G. Condas conveyed the Ranch to each of his six children in undivided l/6th interests. The children 
of John G. Condas are George Condas, Ellen Condas Bayas, Nick Condas (now deceased), 
Alexandra Condas Ockey, Chris Condas (now deceased), and Mary Condas Lehmer (now deceased) 
(collectively the "Siblings"). 
3. In 1976, each of the six Siblings, except Mary Lehmer, conveyed all of their interests 
in the Ranch to irrevocable trusts established for the benefit of their children and nephews, including 
Plaintiffs Scott and Cathy. The transfers into trust were made to minimize estate tax. 
4. Scott is the beneficiary under two trusts. Under the first trust, established by his 
mother, Alexandra Condas Ockey, Scott received an undivided l/12th interest in the Ranch. Under 
the second trust, established by his uncle Nick Condas, Scott received an undivided 1/18th interest 
in the Ranch. Scott's interests equaled approximately 13.88% of the Ranch. 
5. Cathy is the beneficiary under a trust established by her father, Chris Condas. Cathy 
received an undivided l/12th interest in the Ranch. Cathy's interests equaled approximately 8.33% 
of the Ranch. Scott and Cathy's combined interests in the Ranch equalled approximately 22%. 
6. Given its favorable location and surrounding development, the Condas family has 
long had an interest in developing the Ranch Efforts by the family to develop the Ranch stretch 
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back to at least 1975. 
7. Between approximately 1969-1995, business decisions concerning the Ranch and its 
development .followed a common course of dealing. Nick Condas, acting as the "family 
communicator," contacted the various members of the Condas family, solicited their input, generated 
a consensus, and acted as the family spokesperson to direct or carry out the decisions that were 
made. 
8. In May 1989, in an effort to develop the Ranch, the family members who owned 
interests in the Ranch, including Scott and Cathy, entered into an Option To Ground Lease (the 
"Option") with Iron Mountain Resort Corporation, which later changed its name to Iron Mountain 
Alliance, Inc. ("MAT'). At the time, IMAI was a corporation owned by developers Gerald Jackson 
("Jackson") and Hank Rothwell ("Rothwell"). Scott, Cathy, defendant John Lehmer ("Lehmer"), 
and the other family members were all designated as "Lessors" under the Option because the family 
had not yet organized itself into any formal business entity for the purposes of developing the 
Ranch. Under the terms of the Option, MAI agreed to pay the Lessors a specified annual amount 
in exchange for an option to lease the Ranch. The parties entered into an amended Option in May 
1992, although the terms relevant to this case were unchanged by the amendment. 
9. Lehmer was appointed 'Lessors' Representative" in accordance with the terms of the 
Option. As Lessors' Representative, Lehmer was designated as the "official recipient of all 
payments of Option Consideration and all notices under the Option Agreement." In addition, the 
Lessors' Representative was to receive authority from each individual lessor "to act on behalf of the 
others in all matters requiring [the individual Lessor's] consent, cooperation, or assistance under the 
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Option Agreement." The Option was silent concerning any distribution or dissemination of the 
Option consideration. 
10. Each of the individual Lessors, including Scott and Cathy, signed powers of attorney 
authorizing Lehmer to act as the Lessors' Representative under the Option. The powers of attorney 
signed by each of the individual Lessors, including Scott and Cathy, granted Lehmer "the authority 
to act on my behalf in all matters requiring my consent, cooperation, or assistance under the Option" 
and "full power and authority to do everything necessary in exercising any of the powers herein 
granted as fully as I might or could do if personally present." The powers of attorney were silent 
concerning any distribution or dissemination of any funds received under the Option. 
11. At the time of the Option, MAI was the lessee under a lease with the State of Utah 
(the "State Lease"), which pertained to approximately 500 acres of State owned land located in 
proximity to the Ranch. Because the parcels of land subject to the State Lease were interspersed 
within the outside boundaries of the Ranch, the State Lease land was an integral part of any 
projected development of the Ranch. The State Lease was the sole asset of IMAI, but IMAI had an 
annual lease obligation to pay to the State of Utah. 
12. IMAI defaulted on its payment obligations under the Option. As a result of this 
default, IMAI gave Lehmer as Lessors' Representative a promissory note for the lease payment and 
the parties entered into an agreement under which Jackson and Rothwell pledged their stock in IMAI 
to secure payment of the amounts due under the promissory note and Option. 
13. In 1993, MAI again defaulted on its lease payment under the Option. As a result of 
this additional default, Jackson and Rothwell were obligated to tender all the stock in MAI to 
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Lehmer as Lessors' Representative. Because the State Lease required an annual lease payment, 
which was due at the time of the Jackson and Rothwell default, the Lessors had important decisions 
to make concerning the receipt of the MAI stock, what to do with the stock, and whether or how 
to use IMAI and the State Lease to advance the common desire to develop the Ranch. 
14. To address these issues, Nick Condas contacted various members of the Condas . . 
family in accordance,with the family's usual business practice. A As a result of Aese / ^ ^ i 
communications. Nick Condas instructed Lehmer to accept the IMAI stock and to elect and appoint "h-y^Mc^ 
Lehmer, Nick Condas, and John C. Condas as the directors and officers of IMAI. In accordance F&T 
with the instructions from Nick Condas, Lehmer, as Lessors' Representative and holder of IMAI 
stock, elected the board of directors, which in turn appointed the officers. The IMAI stock originally 
received from Jackson and Rothwell no longer exists. 
15. Lehmer also was instructed by Nick Condas feat tho family dcoiro&to reinvest the 
MAI stock toward the development of the Ranch and use IMAI as a mechanism to compensate the 
members of the family who were willing to fund the development of the Ranch and the State Lease 
land with cash and services. At that time, there was an immediate need to make a payment on the 
State Lease and IMAI had no funds with which to make the required payment. 
16. As part of the plan to compensate those family members who were willing to fund 
the development, Lehmer was instructed not to distribute the MAI shares he received from Jackson 
and Rothwell. Instead, MAI's directors resolved to offer to sell shares of IMAI stock at $1.00 per 
share to representatives of each of the six families. To that end, Lehmer, Nick Condas, John C. 
Condas, George Condas, Ellen Bayas and Alexandra Ockey each purchased 1,000 shares in return 
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for $1,000. The $6,000 dollars received by MAI in exchange for the new stock was used to make 
the payments on the State Lease. Similar contributions were made in exchange for stock in 
subsequent years so that MAI could make the required payments under the State Lease. Stock also 
was issued to various family members in exchange for services rendered and as approved by the 
board. 
17. MAI was one of a series of entities, the purpose of which was to meet the obligations 
of the Condas Ranch, and ultimately develop it for profit. 
18. The plaintiffs, through their ownership in the Ranch property, stood to share in any 
profits from the Ranch's ultimate development. 
19. In the late 1980s and into the 1990s, development of the Ranch was not assured. 
20. When Jackson and Rothwell gave up on their attempts to develop the Ranch in 1993, 
the return from the ownership of the Ranch was minimal, and there was an outstanding and ongoing 
liability to pay for the State Lease. 
21. The State Lease was an integral part of the envisioned transformation of the Ranch 
into a commercial real estate development. 
22. The preservation of the State Lease by MAJ through its shareholders contributions 
was a speculative investment, the return on which was tied to the future development of Ranch and 
other contingencies. 
23. Scott believed that when Jackson and Rothwell transferred the MAI stock to John 
Lehmer it had only nominal value. 
24. Under the provisions of the State Lecise, the family had four years to put at least one 
8 
million dollars of ski related improvements on the property, or they would lose the right to purchase 
the 505 acres subject to the lease from the state of Utah. 
25. Neither Lehmer nor MAI at any time concealed the issuance of stock to the various 
family members in exchange for cash or services. / V ^ 
26. As early as i»kkl993, Scott knew that MAI stock had been issued to other family, 
members. For example, Scott asked Nick Condas if Scott could buy some of Nick Condas' IMAI 
stock. Nick declined but suggested that Scott inquire of other family members whether they would 
be willing to sell their stock. Scott may not have been included in much of the early to mid-1990's 
activity regarding development of the Ranch, but he was "obsessed" with the Ranch generally and 
read everything he could about the Ranch. When Scott asked Nick Condas questions about the 
Ranch, Nick directed him to all relevant records concerning the Ranch that, in fact, were maintained 
in an office Scott shared with Nick Condas. 
27* Scott had additional specific knowledge about the MAI stock: 
a. Scott knew in 1994 that MAI Stock had been transferred by Jackson and 
Rothwell to John Lehmer. 
b. Scott knew that John Lehmer must have voted the IMAI shares that were 
turned over to him. 
c. Scott knew that his cousin, John Condas. was elected as a member of the 
MAI Board. 
d. Scott knew that his mother, Alexandra Ockey, was president of IMAI, and 
she had stock in MAI. 
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e. Alexandra Ockey showed Scott an MAI stock ledger, reflecting who had 
shares in the corporation. 
£ Scott knew that family members were obtaining IMAI stock in return for 
services rendered in furtherance of the development. 
g. Scott knew others had shares in IMAI, including those who had no interest 
in Ranch. 
Scott either knew or had reason to know of the events giving rise to a conversion 
the three years after any conversion of MAI stock. 
29. As early as mid-1993, Cathy knew that MAI stock had been issued to other family 
members and knew about the opportunity each of the six famibes had to purchase IMAI stock at 
$1.00 per share. Cathy overheard conversations between her father, Chris Condas, and her Uncle 
Nick Condas, pertaining to the payment of the State Lease through the purchase of IMAI stock. 
30. Cathy's father told her that he did not think it was a good investment to purchase 
shares in MAI. After Chris Condas decided not to purchase the stock, he told his children, Cathy 
and John C. Condas, about the opportunity to buy MAI stock and asked if they were interested in 
purchasing shares in MAI. John Condas accepted the offer and purchased stock in 1993 and in 
subsequent years. Cathy did not. 
31. Cathy had additional specific knowledge about the IMAI stock: 
n ^ Cnthy 1;ncv,r thnt Tnnlnnn nnH Pntlnvrll hfld trnnrfrrrrri thn TMAT Ttnrlr nRrr 
bku liLiii'd hu Uiiule Nick and rather speak aooui die uppofftmtyto-bay 
****^ __ #T 
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b. Cathy knew that the offer to purchase MAI shares involved the entity that 
had the State Lease. She also knew that the lease payments to the state were 
going to go up in the following years. 
c. Cathy understood that the family members who participated in the making 
the payments on the State Lease through MAI would share in the profits, if 
any, from the Ranch's development. 
d. Cathy saw papers pertaining to MAI that revealed that John Lehmer, her 
brother and Uncle Nick had become officers or directors of the corporation. 
32. Cathy had knowledge of MATs role as a development entity for the Ranch as a 
whole, including her interest as a member of IMHG, and acted to protect that interest by successfully 
petitioning the family to add her father, Chris Condas, as a member of the MAI Board of Directors, 
which occurred on December 12, 1993. 
33. Generally, Cathy did not want to know about the Ranch and its development. As 
further evidence of Cathy's lack of interest in the Ranch, Cathy also tried to sell her share of the 
Ranch for a sum much less than she has received to date. 
34. \ Cathy either knew or had reason to know of the events giving rise to a conversion 
claim within the three years after any conversion of IMAI stock. 
35. As of the date of trial, ownership of stock in IMAI was as follows: 
John R. Lehmer 23,500 
John C. Condas 11,362 
George J. Condas 13,357 
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Nick J. Condas 8,701 
Chris J. Condas 2,658 
Alexandra C. Ockey 13,357 
Susi L. Kontgis 14,474 
Ellen C.Bayas 13,357 
j/36. \ Scott and Cathy had notice of the transfer of MAI stock to others, but failed to 
timely cMsapprove of the transfer of the stock. 
37. The ownership of the State Lease added value to the development of the Ranch and 
ultimately allowed for the purchase by IMAI of the State Lease land, 505 acres, and an additional 
410 acres that became part of the overall Ranch development. 
38. American Skiing Corporation (ASC) purchased the Wolf Mountain Resort and 
transformed it into the Canyons. As a result of IMAI's position regarding the State Lease, an 
agreement was reached between the development entities and ASC that provided for the expansion 
of the Canyons to include the portions of Ranch property and allowed the family real estate 
development to become much more valuable with the inclusion of ski in - ski out lots for sale. 
39. The nature of IMAI changed substantially after Jackson and Rothwell transferred 
MAI stock to Lehmer as Lessors' Representative in 1993. Numerous individuals, including Condas 
family members and various third-parties but not including the Plaintiffs, invested substantial time, 
money and other resources in developing the Ranch. 
£0. Scott and Cathy received and retained the benefits of the Ranch's development made 
possible by the issuance of the EVLAI stock to those who funded the development, contributed 
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services to the development, paid for the State Lease, and made possible the acquisition of additional 
property for benefit of the entire development. 
41. Scott and Cathy had knowledge of the issuance of MAI stock to those who funded 
and contributed services to the Ranch development before they accepted the benefits made possible 
by such contributions and stock issuances. 
42. Since 1993, the Ranch has become part of a successful real estate development 
through MAI and through Iron Mountain Holding Group, a limited liability company in which S cott 
and Cathy have ownership interests. Both Scott and Cathy have received substantial sums due to 
their ownership interest in the Ranch, and stand to receive more in the future. By accepting these 
benefits of development, with knowledge of both the ownership of the Ranch (through Iron 
Mountain Holding Group) and the development mechanism through MAI, Scott and Cathy have 
ratified the alleged conversion of MAI stock. 
43. Not only is there no evidence of concealment or other misleading conduct by the 
Defendants, the evidence is persuasive as to both Scott and Cathy that this is not a case where either 
of them should be relieved of their responsibihty to be alert to their circumstances and assert their 
claims in a timely fashion. 
44. Scott and Cathy knew that shares of MAI were not distributed or issued In 
proportion to family members' interests in the 2700 acres of Ranch property, nor in proportion to 
their interests in the Option to Ground Lease. 
45. Scott and Cathy also knew that the shares of MAI were issued to representatives of 
the six families who contributed money for meeting the State Lease obligations in accordance with 
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the fyftilieg.agreemenUo use IMAI as a mechanism to preserve that lease and develop the Ranch. 
46. The conversion of MAI stock occurred, if at all, no later than July 1, 1993 when 
Jackson and Rothwell's stock was received by the Lessors' Representative and new shares issued 
to Condas family members. Plaintiffs claim for conversion accrued at that time. Plaintiffs' 
complaint was not filed until June 19,1997, nearly four years later. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy of law with respect to the third and sixth claims 
for relief. 
2. With respect to breach of fiduciary duty and conversion claims against Lehmer and 
the conversion claim against IMAI, the Plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence of damages and they 
expressly waived any damage claim during argument and by electing to proceed at trial solely in 
equity. 
3. No equitable remedy exists for the breach of fiduciary duty or conversion claims 
against Lehmer. The equitable remedy Plaintiffs desire is the "return" of their IMAI stock, in the 
form of almost 22% of IMAI as it exists today. While the case law supports Plaintiffs' argument 
that a corporation can be forced to issue shares to which they are found to be entitled, see West v. 
Tintic Standard Mining Co., 263 P. 490,495 (Utah 1928), Plaintiffs did not assert a claim against 
MAI for breach of fiduciary duty. While Mr. Lehmer is a significant shareholder in MAI, he is 
not the corporation and IMAI is not even alleged to have had a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiffs, 
let alone breached the duties that inhere in such a relationship. Therefore, while the Court could 
order MAI to issue stock to Plaintiffs, to order John Lehmer to give up his shares is to permit 
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Plaintiffs to receive a damages remedy without the necessity of proving their damages. 
4. The stock originally received from Jackson and Rothwell no longer exists. Lehmer 
does not possess any such shares and, therefore, the allegedly converted property cannot be returned. 
Because Lehmer does not possess the allegedly converted property, return of the stock by Lehmer 
as an equitable remedy is not available to the Plaintiffs. 
5. The Court cannot identify an equitable remedy that may be enforced against Lehmer 
and the Plaintiffs were unable to point the Court to any equitable remedy. Because Plaintiffs have 
waived any claim to damages and no equitable remedy is available with respect to their claims 
against Lehmer, Plaintiffs' claims against Lehmer fail for lack of a remedy. 
6. As against both Defendants, Plaintiffs conversion claims are governed by a three year 
statute of limitations found at §78-12-26(2) Utah Code Ann. The statute does not mandate the 
application of the "discovery rule" to the accrual to Plaintiffs' conversion claim. Whether or not the 
discovery rule applies is a question of law. See, Horn v. Utah Dept of Public Safety, 962 P.2d 95, 
101 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Plaintiffs presented no evidence against either Defendant to show 
fraudulent concealment or any other wrongdoing that would invoke the Court's power to apply a 
discovery rule to delay the accrual of Plaintiffs' cause of action for conversion. 
7. Plaintiffs became aware, or reasonably should have become aware, of the possibility 
of a claim for conversion before expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, 
the conversion claim is barred by the statute of limitations. 
8. Even if the Plaintiffs' conversion claim against the Defendants was not barred by the 
statute of limitations, the claim is barred by the doctrine of ratification. The defendants' established 
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by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiffs ratified any conversion of MAI stock. 
9. By accepting the benefits of development of the PLanch with prior knowledge of the 
development process, the ownership of the Ranch and the MAI stock, Scott and Cathy ratified the 
actions of the Defendants. 
16 
4605 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the-4/ aay of February, 2003,1 caused to be hand-delivered a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the 
following: 
Craig G. Adamson 
Eric P. Lee 
Craig A. Hoggan 
Dart, Adamson & Donovan 
370 East South Temple, #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Michael S. Johnson 
350 South 400 East, Suite 101A 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Matthew L. Lalli, Esq. 
SNELL & WTLMER 
15 West South Temple Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
L7 +tul t*flSbUc&hvi 
C \WP\Closcd\Condas\Fmdmgs o f Pact and Conclusions of Law wpd 
17 
4606 
